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Random numbers are essential for multiple applications,
including cryptography, financial security, digital rights
management and scientific simulations. However, produc-
ing random numbers from a finite state machine, such as a
classical computer, is impossible. One option is to use con-
ventional quantum random number generators (QRNGs)
based on the intrinsic uncertainty of quantum measure-
ment outcomes1, 2, 3, 4, 5. The problem in this case is that pri-
vate randomness relies on assumptions on the internal func-
tioning of the measurement devices6. “Device-independent”
QRNGs not relying on devices inner workings assumptions
can be built6, 7 but are impractical. They require a detec-
tion efficiency that, so far, has only be achieved with trapped
ions7 and with photons detected with transition-edge super-
conducting sensors8, 9. Here we introduce a novel protocol
for quantum private randomness generation that makes no
assumption on the functioning of the devices and works even
with very low detection efficiency. We implement the proto-
col using weak coherent states and standard single-photon
detectors. Our results pave the way towards a second gener-
ation of more secure practical QRNGs.
The protocol is based on the semi-device-independent (SDI)
approach to randomness generation introduced by Pawłowski
and Brunner10. The SDI approach works in a prepare-and-
measure scenario in which no assumption is made on the in-
ternal functioning of the preparation and measurement devices,
except that the dimension of the quantum system accessed by
the measurement device is bounded. Remarkably, unlike device-
independent QRNGs, our protocol is able to certify randomness
even with very low detection efficiency, thus proving right the
conjecture that SDI protocols could be robust against detection
loophole attacks11, 12. We demonstrate this protocol by experi-
mentally generating certified private random bits with weak co-
herent states and standard single-photon detectors providing an
overall detection efficiency of 6%.
The protocol works in the scenario and under the assumptions
described in Fig. 1. Each round of the experiment produces an
event (b|x,y,z). The user follows the steps below:
Step 1. The user estimates the probabilities p(b|x,y > λ ,z)
and also the probabilities p′(b|x,y > λ ,z) obtained after remov-
ing all events in which b = /0.
Step 2. The goal of step 2 is to allow the user to check whether
or not there is shared randomness between x and z that may
compromise the randomness and privacy of the final string. For
that, the user estimates the probability p′av = 18 ∑x,z p
′(0|x,y >
λ ,z) and the observed overall detection efficiency η =
∑x,z∑b∈{0,1} p(b|x,y > λ ,z)/∑x,z∑b∈{0,1, /0} p(b|x,y > λ ,z). If
p′av is above a certain threshold that depends on λ and η , then
the user can conclude that there is no shared randomness and
moves on to the step 3 (see Methods). If it is below this thresh-
old, then the user aborts.
Step 3. The user defines a bit stringS as follows: b if y > λ
and b ∈ {0,1}, 0 if y > λ and b = /0. Hereafter we will denote
these events as (b|x,z). The goal of step 3 is to estimate the
randomness inS . The method for this is as follows.
The Lemma in Methods shows that the best strategy for an
adversary without shared randomness is the following: For each
x, the adversary’s agent in P prepares a pure qubit state |x〉 in
the equatorial plane of the Bloch sphere. For a given z, the ad-
versary’s agent in M: (I) With frequency pz, performs a mea-
surement that projects the qubit into |mz = 0〉 or |mz = 1〉 and
outputs b = 0 or b = 1, respectively. |mz = 0〉 and |mz = 1〉 are
orthogonal and both in the equatorial plane of the Bloch sphere.
(II) With frequency q0z , makes no measurement on the qubit and
outputs b = 0. (III) With frequency q1z , makes no measurement
on the qubit and outputs b = 1. Since in those cases in which
no measurement is performed, the choice of output b = 0 or
b = 1 can be done using a pseudo random number generator
(PRNG), we will assume that there is no randomness with fre-
quency q0z + q
1
z . By the normalization condition for probabili-
ties, pz +q0z +q
1
z = 1. The amount of randomness in the events
(b|x,z), measured by the min-entropy, is
H∞(b|x,z) =−pz log2 |〈mz = b|x〉|2, (1)
where |〈mz = b|x〉|2 is the probability of projecting into |mz = b〉
when the state prepared is |x〉. Since P and M are black boxes,
the user does not know pz, |x〉 and |mz = b〉. The user only has
access to the probabilities p(b|x,z) that can be estimated from
the experiment. The relation between them is
p(b|x,z) = qbz + pz|〈mz = b|x〉|2. (2)
The randomness indicator used in the protocol is a list ~P of
the 8 probabilities p(0|x,z). After the experiment is complete,
the user has each p(0|x,z) with a confidence
p(0|x,z)min ≤ p(0|x,z)≤ p(0|x,z)max. (3)
Then, a numerical minimization of the min-entropies of the 8
events (0|x,z) under the constraints (3) is performed to obtain
the amount of randomness.
What is remarkable in our protocol is that ~P allows the
user to certify more randomness than with any indicator used
in previous works, e.g., the average success probability10, 13
pav = 18 ∑x,z p(0|x,z), or the worst case probability11, 14, pwc =
minx,z p(0|x,z). The benefit of using ~P over pwc or pav is illus-
trated in Fig. 2. This clear advantage contrasts with the marginal
increase in the amount of certified randomness found in Bell-
inequality scenarios when using the whole probability distribu-
tion instead of a single number15, 16.
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Figure 1: Scenario and assumptions of our SDI randomness generation protocol. In each round of the experiment, the prepara-
tion device P receives an input x and emits a system that goes into a measurement device M that receives an input z and produces an
outcome b. There is a blocker B that may or may not block the system depending on input y. The assumptions made in our protocol
are: (i) P and M are black boxes built by the adversary, their internal functioning is unknown and inaccessible to the user. Each
device may contain an agent of the adversary. (ii) P and M are shielded in the sense that P only receives input x ∈ {00,01,10,11}
and only outputs a qubit state ρx, and M only receives a qubit (or nothing, i.e., /0) and z ∈ {0,1} as inputs, and only outputs
b ∈ {0,1, /0}. The outcome b = /0 corresponds to the case in which no result is obtained either because the blocker B was acting or
because the detection efficiency is not perfect. (iii) B only receives y ∈ [0,1] as input and blocks (absorbs) the qubit if and only if
y ≤ λ (where λ is characteristic of B). (iv) x,y,z are apparently random. A string is apparently random when it has passed some
standard tests of randomness, but may fail to pass other tests. (v) The laboratory containing P, B, M and the generators of x, y and z
is shielded in the sense that nothing can enter or exit. The purpose of the protocol is to generate certified random private bits from
apparently random bits. The final string of certified random private bits is obtained after post-processing the events (b|x,y,z). This
certification follows from the analysis of the conditional probability distributions p(b|x,y,z) estimated by the user.
Step 4. The user extracts the final private random bit string
by applying standard post-processing techniques on S (e.g.,
ref.18).
Our experimental implementation of the protocol is shown
schematically in Fig. 3. As the sources of x, y and z we use three
commercial QRNGs QUANTIS19. They satisfy the definition of
apparent randomness because they have passed standard tests of
randomness19. Each QRNG supplies a continuous string of bits.
The field programmable gate array (FPGA) in P produces an
electrical synchronization signal and attenuated optical pulses
(weak coherent quantum states). The optical pulses are then sent
through a sequence of four spatial light modulators (SLMs)20.
Sets of lenses are employed to project the image of one SLM
onto the next one. The qubit state preparation in P (the projec-
tions in M) is implemented using SLM 1 and SLM 2 (SLM 3
and SLM 4) working with amplitude-only and phase-only mod-
ulation, respectively. We use the linear transverse momentum of
the single photons transmitted by the SLMs as the degree of free-
dom for codifying qubit states. This is done by making only two
paths available for the photon transmission through the SLMs21.
One has full control of the real and imaginary parts of the states
being generated and measured through the control of the grey
level of the SLMs pixels22, 23. The advantage of this setup (with
respect to other encoding approaches, such as polarization or
time-bin) is that it can be easily adapted to codify higher dimen-
sional quantum states23, 24, 25 to study more complex scenarios
for quantum randomness generation.
The repetition rate of the attenuated optical pulses is set to
30 Hz, which is the limit of the employed SLMs. The SLMs are
controlled by their corresponding FPGA units. The modulation
applied in each SLM is triggered by the sync signal. An internal
delay in respect to the AOM in the FPGAs is used to ensure that
the SLMs in P and M are properly set by the time each coher-
ent state is sent. Each QRNG produces approximately 4 million
bits/s, which means that for every sync signal there are always
fresh random numbers available to randomly prepare and mea-
sure. Each round, pre-determined phase and amplitude masks
are applied to the SLMs based on the new numbers produced by
the QRNGs. These masks are built such that the states are the
ones required in the protocol from refs.22, 23. The optical blocker
placed between them is a commercial shutter based on liquid
crystal display technology, and is controlled by a third FPGA
unit, fed by another QRNG. The blocker’s electronics also re-
ceive the clock signal from P, thus operating synchronously
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Figure 3: Experimental setup. Attenuated optical pulses are produced with a continuous wave laser, an acousto-optic modulator
(AOM), and adjustable optical attenuators. The SLMs are controlled by their corresponding FPGA electronics, which prepare the
qubit state and perform the appropriate projection based on the supplied random numbers from their corresponding QRNG. The
three QRNGs provide the random numbers required for our SDI quantum randomness generation protocol. In order to detect shared
randomness between the preparation and measurement stages, a random blocker is placed in the path between them (see Methods).
A computer (PC) receives the blocking and the random settings information to estimate the min-entropy of the generated random
bit string.
with the rest of the setup. For each round of the experiment,
the blocker’s FPGA unit randomly decides whether it will block
the pulse or not, with an user-adjustable blocking probability. If
a pulse is blocked, this information is sent to a computer (PC).
For our experimental implementation, with η = 0.06, a block-
ing rate of 99% was employed to guarantee that there is no
shared randomness. The threshold for privacy as a function of
the blocking rate and η is presented in Fig. 4. Clearly, one can
see that our generated bit string is certifiably private.
Remarkably, Fig. 4 also shows that, for η > 0, there is always
a blocking rate smaller than 1 such that observing p′av > 0.5 al-
lows the user to guarantee with a 99% confidence that there is
no shared randomness.
The optical quality of the experiment is indicated by the fact
that the experimental probabilities p′(0|x,y > λ ,z) show a very
good agreement with the predictions of quantum mechanics, as
illustrated in Fig. 5. In each round of the experiment 0.0093 true
random bits are certified, yielding a random bit generation rate
of 0.28 Hz. The effectiveness of our randomness indicator ~P is
demonstrated by the fact that no random bits would have been
certified using pwc or pav. The final certified bit stringS gener-
ated in our experiment is 105 bits long. We emphasize that our
rate could be increased to the Mbit/s range with current tech-
nology of SLMs based on integrated silicon photonics26. Even
without modern SLMs, the private random bit generation rate of
our experiment can be increased by a factor of 20 by decreas-
ing the blocking rate to 0.8. Therefore, our scheme is capable
of outperforming the rate produced by recent experiments based
on Bell inequalities with photons detected with superconducting
transition-edge sensors (0.4 Hz with overall detection efficiency
of 75%9).
In conclusion, we have experimentally demonstrated a new
protocol for generating private random numbers which is more
secure than conventional QRNGs and is, at the same time, prac-
tical for real-life applications. It is more secure because: (i) it
does not require the assumptions on the internal functioning of
the devices needed in current QRNGs and (ii) it does not need
the assumption that the preparation and measurement devices
have no initial shared randomness. It is practical because it does
not require high detection efficiency. It is the first protocol for
randomness generation invulnerable to the detection loophole.
Therefore, in this work we have demonstrated a novel approach
that can rise up to the challenge of real-life applications requir-
ing private, secure and high-rate random number generation cer-
tified by quantum mechanics.
Methods
Blocking to counteract shared randomness
In order to understand why the use of B is sufficient to coun-
teract any shared randomness, imagine an adversary who sells
the user P and M devices equipped with identical PRNGs fed
with the same seed. There are three ways in which the same
seed can be fed: (i) The devices may have the seed stored inside
them since they were built by the adversary. Option (i) is prob-
lematic for the adversary, since the user can employ several P
and M devices paired randomly. If all of them share the same
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Figure 2: Comparison among randomness indicators. Large
diagram: Randomness, measured by the min-entropy, certified
using ~P (green curve), pwc (red curve) and pav (blue curve). It
is assumed that p(0|x,z)min = α − δ2 and p(0|x,z)max = α + δ2 ,
with δ = 10−4. The results for pav are taken from Mironowicz et
al.17. The threshold probability for certifying randomness when
using ~P is 0.5, while it is 0.75 for pwc and 0.829 for pav. Small
diagram: Randomness certified using ~P for small α and δ =
10−8. pwc and pav cannot certify randomness in this case.
random string, correlations will be seen in success probabilities
if all devices get the same inputs. (ii) The seed may be sent to
P and M when they are operating. Option (ii) is not possible
in our scenario with P and M inside a shielded laboratory. (iii)
The seed may be communicated somehow from the adversary’s
agent in P to the adversary’s agent in M using the qubit during
the protocol. In this case, randomly blocking some rounds of
the experiment helps the user against the communication of the
agent’s seed. Even if the agents in P and M manage to establish
a common seed, they would still need a way of synchronizing
their strategies. That is, even if they know the value of the ran-
dom variable for every round of the protocol, the agents need to
agree on which round of protocol they are currently in. If we
assume the most favourable condition for the adversary, which
is that the synchronization uses only one round of the protocol,
then in this round the success probability will be 12 . It drops to
1
2 because in this round of synchronization there is no correla-
tion between the output b of M and the input x of P. Note that
synchronization will again be required as soon as a new qubit is
blocked, because otherwise P will count one more round than
M, and again the success probability will drop. This allows us
to compute how often the agents need to synchronize and which
is the impact of this procedure on the average success probabil-
ity. We plot this in Fig. 4, taking the most favourable conditions
for the adversary, i.e., assuming that she can cause the devices
to succeed with probability 1 when not synchronizing and that
there is no detection only during synchronization.
It is also important to notice that B also helps the user in case
the adversary’s agents in P and M share quantum correlations.
Even if the agents have entangled pairs of particles, this is use-
less to them since the agents do not know whether or not their
particles belong to the same pair.
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Figure 4: Threshold value for p′av to guarantee that there is
no shared randomness with a confidence of 0.99 and taking
the most favourable conditions for the adversary, as a func-
tion of the blocking rate and for different values of η . The
invulnerability against the detection loophole follows from the
fact that, for η > 0, there is always a blocking rate smaller than
1 such that observing p′av > 0.5 allows the user to guarantee that
there is no shared randomness. The dot with error bars indicates
the p′av observed in our experiment in which the blocking rate
is 0.99 and η = 0.06. The error bars are calculated using Pois-
sonian statistics. The blocking rate was chosen to show that we
can discard shared randomness even with a very low detection
efficiency (η = 0.001).
Most general attack with no shared randomness
Assuming no shared randomness, the most general attack that
the adversary can follow is always equivalent to performing
some positive-operator valued measure (POVM) in M. How-
ever, this attack is difficult to parameterize. The Lemma below
enables us to use classical preprocessing and projective mea-
surements to describe the most general attack that the adversary
can perform.
Lemma: In a prepare-and-measure scenario without shared
randomness, if the communicated system is a qubit and the out-
put is b ∈ 0,1, any conditional probability distribution p(b|x,z)
can be achieved by choosing outcome b= 0 with probability q0z ,
outcome b = 1 with probability q1z , and performing a projective
measurement with probability pz = 1−q0z −q1z .
Proof: For each z let us consider the most general two-
outcome POVM. Let Ebz be the POVM element corresponding
to the outcome b. Let E0z =
(
cz 0
0 c′z
)
and the basis in
which E0z is diagonal be {|mz = 0〉, |mz = 1〉}. For any state
|x〉= dzx|0〉z+ezx|1〉z, the probability to observe outcome b= 0
is p(0|x,z) = cz|dzx|2 + c′z|ezx|2. Without loss of generality, we
may assume that cz ≥ c′z. If we set q0z = c′z and q1z = 1− cz and
choose the projective measurement to be in the basis {|mz =
0〉, |mz = 1〉}, then the prescription given in the Lemma exactly
reproduces the probability distribution of the outcomes of the
measurement Ebz .
To certify randomness the user estimates p(0|x,z) from the
experimental data and then uses the Lemma to numerically op-
timize over q0z , q
1
z , |x〉, |mz = 0〉, |mz = 1〉 minimizing the min-
entropy for x,z.
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